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Crime  can be viewed as an outcome  of rational  choices by criminals  weighing  expected
gains and losses (Becker,  1968).2  The parameters  in this calculation  will depend  in part on how
much non-criminals  care about public  safety.  In various ways  - lobbying  for crime  prevention
by the state, being watchful  neighbors,  spending  on private security  measures  - household-level
demand  for public safety is likely  to influence  the extent  of crime  and the appropriate  policy
response. However,  we know rather little about  the demand  for public safety at household  level. 3
The problem is that public safety is a public  good. One cannot directly  observe  demand  - the
way one can for private (market)  goods.
There are a number  of possible  ways one might try to identify  household  demand  for
public safety.  One way is to value  the human  and property  losses from reported  crime,  though
naturally  this is unlikely  to fully capture  the welfare  losses, including  amongst  those  who do not
actually experience  crime, but live in fear of it. Crime  under-reporting  is also known  to be
common.  Another  approach  is to estimate  the impact  on local property  prices,  treating  public
safety  as a local public good and assuming  that housing  markets work  well, including  that there
is free mobility (Thaler, 1978;  Clark  and Cosgrove, 1990).  Alternatively  one might assume that
observed  leveis of local public  spending  are optimal  for the median  voter in each local
government  area (Borcherding  and Deacon, 1972).  Or one might ask people  to attach  a value to
public-safety,  or some specific  intervention;  various  survey-based  methods  exist for valuing
2  For a recent overview of the main issues in the economics of crime see Ehrlich (1996). Also see the discussion
in Dilulio (1996).
3  There have been a number of studies of average crime rates, and public spending on crime prevention, across
municipalities, including Greenberg et al., (1979), Behrman and Craig (1987) and Gyimah-Brempong (1989).
The level of aggregation naturally clouds the interpretation of such studies.
2public services (Gibson, 1980; Bohm, 1984; Jacoby, 1994). Yet another approach is to rely on
qualitative questions on the importance of public-safety; there is recent experimental evidence
suggesting that this type of method is more reliable in valuing social programs than open-ended
willingness to pay questions (Gregory, MacGregor and Lichstein, 1992).
The present paper proposes an approach to studying the demand for public safety in the
spirit of the last approach. The method is based on subjective-qualitative assessments of public
safety made in the context of a comprehensive socio-economic survey. The method allows us to
address a number of questions about the socio-economic determinants of the demand for public
safety.
One such question of interest is whether public safety is a normal good. Since it is a
public good we do not expect strong income effects, at least within neighborhoods; everyone
within some geographic area presumably enjoys the same objective level of public safety (though
different people may attach different subjective values to it). However, the utility value attached
to public safety may well change with income via its effect on demand for complementary
private goods. Also, the desire to improve public safety might well have a stronger income effect
than the current level of public safety. If so, this might explain any tendency for poorer areas to
enjoy less public safety, in that lower demand at the individual level makes it harder to mobilize
public actions which makes those areas safer.
There are other household characteristics that one might expect to influence the demand
for public safety.  One's priors about how safe or unsafe one is will clearly matter. Those priors
are formed in a world of incomplete information in which both psychological and social factors
come into play. There is evidence from psychology that cognitive dissonance (arising from the
displeasure attached to contemplating adverse events) often leads people to downplay their
3exposure to unsafe environments; for example, regulations are required to force people to wear
safety hats in unsafe jobs. 4 One's knowledge about the true probability distribution will
presumably matter to such effects. Thus it can be argued that household characteristics such as
the amount of education can influence the extent to which one is vulnerable to cognitive
dissonance, and so influence demand for public safety.
Another question of interest concerns the role of inequality. There is evidence that U.S.
states with higher income inequality tend to have higher crime rates (Ehrlich, 1973); Fajnzylber
et al. (1998) also find such a relationship across countries. The usual explanation is that
inequality increases the potential gains from crime (Ehrlich, 1973). Another possiblity  - which
we have not seen discussed - is that the income slope of demand for public safety might fall as
income rises (even if it is the rich who care most about public safety). There is presumably only
so much public safety one can possibly want, so diminishing income effects must eventually set
in. Then the demand for public safety will be concave in income, and hence aggregate demand
will be lower (for any given mean income) when inequality is higher. Our approach allows us to
test that hypothesis.
We also want to test the importance of neighborhood effects as influences on household-
level demand for public safety.  One issue is whether there exists a self-correcting mechanism in
response to crime, as postulated by Philipson and Posner (1996).  Does a low level of public
safety in a neighborhood stimulate household-level demand for public safety? If the answer is
yes, then this can help explain crime cycles over time.
4  Akerlof and Dickens (1982) review the evidence and provide a choice-theoretic economic model of this form
of behavior.
4It is thought  that strong  geographic  effects  on crime incidence  can also arise from social
interactions  within neighborhoods,  whereby  one person's decision  to commit  a crime  positively
affects  his neighbor's decision  (Glaeser  et al., 1996).  The notion of "safe" and "unsafe"
neighborhoods  is common. 5 But what are the "unsafe  areas"? Crime  is widely  thought  to be a
bigger problem in poor areas. 6 One  reason might be that living in a poor area means that one's
neighbors do less to prevent crime,  assuming  that household  demand  for public safety is a
normal good. Then  poor areas  will be less safe, which  will presumably  increase  one's own
concern about public safety  at any given income  level.  Against  this effect,  rich areas will offer
higher takings  for robbers, which  will presumably  increase  demand  for public safety relative  to
poor areas. For example, a recent magazine article on crime in America wrote that "...  there are
signs that refugees  from city centers,  driven out to the suburbs  by fear of crime, have drawn  the
criminals  after them" (The Economist,  October  3, 1998,  p.38).
A related question  our approach  can throw light on is the role of education,  as an external
(neighborhood)  effect  as well as an internal  effect  (of the household's  own education,  as
discussed  above). 7 If own-education  matters  to demand  for public  safety via its effects on
knowledge  about  the true probabilities  of crime, then one's neighbors'  education  could well have
the samiie  effect,  assuming  that education  fosters  different  knowledge  sets in different  people but
5  When information about the chances of punishment is limited and geographically specific, multiple equilibria
can arise such that different crime rates are observed for otherwise similar neighborhoods (Sah, 1991). This
also suggests that it may be difficult to explain empirically the observed geographic differences in crime
incidence and hence demand for public safety.
6  Behrman and Craig (1987) find that the allocation of police across neighborhoods of Baltimore, U.S.A.,
responds negatively to average income of the neighborhood, which they interpret as an effect on the demand
for public safety.
7  There is evidence that the cost of producing public safety (measured by inverse crime rates) is lower in
municipalities (in Florida, U.S.A.) with higher education levels (Gyimah-Brempong, 1989).
5that knowledge is shared amongst neighbors. the  effects of household attributes, such as income
and education, could well interact strongly with neighborhood characteristics; for example,
having a high household income may matter more to one's  demand for public safety if one lives
in a poor area.
The following section takes a preliminary look at our data from Brazil, where crime and
public safety have become serious concerns, as in other countries in Latin America and
elsewhere.'  Section 3 discusses how the survey results can be interpreted theoretically. The key
to our approach is to view subjective, qualitative, assessments of the importance as an ordinal
indicator of the latent marginal utility of public safety. This motivates an econometric model of
the demand for public safety, which is outlined in section 4. Our results are presented in section
5.  Section 6 offers some conclusions.
2.  A first look at the data
We shall use data gathered as part of the Brazilian Living Standard Measurement Survey
for 1996 managed and collected by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. The
sample frame covered the Northeast and Southeast of Brazil, representing about 75% of the
population. (The regions excluded were the Amazon and the Center/West.) The sample size was
4922 households. The survey follows the established practices for these surveys (Grosh and
Munoz, 1996).
8  For example,  homicide  rates have  been on the rise in Latin  America  since  the mid-  1980s,  and the average  rate
is higher  than in any of the other  principal  regions  of the world  (Fajnzylber  et al., 1998).
6An unusual feature of the survey is that it asked for subjective information from the head
of the household on self-rated welfare in terms of various categories of goods, including public
safety. Specifically, the head of the household was asked:
(1) "How would you judge the living conditions of your household in relation to public
safety?" The answer for each was given on a scale from one (very bad) to five (very good). We
call the answers to this question, the Current Value of Public Safety (CVPS).
(2) "If you could improve conditions of members of this household what importance
would you attach to public safety?" This time a number is given on a scale one (not important) to
four (very important). We call this the Desire to Improve Public Safety (DIPS).
Clearly the answers respondents give to such questions will make implicit assumptions
about many things, including household circumstances, place of residence, and the behavior of
others (neighbors, governments, the police).  Later we will try to model the determinants of
CVPS  and DIPS.
Descriptive statistics for public safety are in Table 1. With respect to CVPS, 38 percent of
the respondents assessed current public safety as "bad" or "very bad". For DIPS, more than half
thought that public safety is "very important" to improve. Those who think the current situation
is worse, tend to consider it more important to improve. The Spearman rank correlation is -0.07.
While this is significantly different from zero (at the 5% level), the low value of the rank
correlation also shows that the assessed current level of public safety is not the only factor
explaining the desire to improve public safety.
To investigate the income effect on answers to the Current Value and Desire to Improve
Questions, we offer Figures 1 and 2. We use total expenditure on consumption (including
imputed values of consumption from income in kind) per person as the "income" variable on the
7horizontal axis. The graphs are non-parametric regressions of CVPS against expenditure per
person. 9 In addition we give results for the same question asked about education, health,
housing, leisure, food, clothing, work and transport.
To help interpret these and other graphs in the paper, Figure 3 gives the cumulative
distribution of consumption.
Figure 1 shows clear income effects for all except public safety, for which there is very
little increase with rising total expenditure. Very different effects are found for DIPS (Figure 2).
The importance to improve public safety tends to increase noticeably as expenditure rises. This
"income effect" on DIPS is stronger than for the private goods, for which the desire to improve
does not vary as much by expenditure level, and starts to decrease for most categories at high
consumption levels (the upper 10-15% of people ranked by consumption).
3.  A theoretical interpretation of the data
The standard model of consumer choice with a public good can be readily adapted to help
interpret the answers to these subjective valuation questions. The Current Value Question can be
interpreted as referring to an underlying sub-utility function for each good, while the
improvement question can be interpreted in terms of marginal utilities.
Consider the case with n private goods (qi, i=l,..,n) and one public good, namely public
safety, denoted s, which we take to be objectively known. The utility derived from public safety
depends on private goods consumed, which also matter to utility in their own right. The
household maximizes a utility function defined on the consumptions of all goods:
9  We used the Lowess  smoother  as programmed  in STATA  5.0.
8u(ff(q, ),--,  fn (qn  );  f(  ,  qn)] '  (1)
where ft  (i=1 ,..,n; s) is the utility from good i, subject to the budget constraint:
y=X  piqi  (2)
The utility maximum gives the usual indirect utility function, v(p, y, s) where p = (p,  pn)  is the
price vector for the private goods.
We interpret CVPS as a direct indicator of the sub-utility function f5 . By contrast, the
answers given for DIPS can be interpreted as revealing the marginal utility of public safety:
Au  d  t9u 9f.  - dv(p,y,s)  (3)
dOs dfs.ds  as
The above model can help interpret Figures 1 and 2.  Since public safety is a norrnal
good, we do not expect a strong income effect on the current level.  The income effect is clearly
much smaller for public safety than the (largely) private goods (Figure 1). There is still, however,
a tendency for the current valuation of public safety to also increase with consumption per capita.
This could reflect the fact that the question is asking about the value that the household attaches
to public safety; that will depend on household attributes as well as the actual level of public
safety.  Thus an income effect on CVPS could arise from non-separability in the utility function.
If, as in the specification in equation (1), one postulates that the sub-utility of public safety
depended positively on consumption of private goods with positive income effects then one
would expect to obtain a positive income effect on DIPS.  An alternative explanation is that the
income effect of CVPS is due to neighborhood effects, whereby richer people are better able to
mobilize local public action to prevent crime or move to the safer neighborhoods. This assumes
9that public safety has properties of a local public good; clearly, if public safety is a pure public
good nationally, then this effect would not be possible.
How can we interpret the strong income effect on DIPS in Figure 2?  If public safety is a
normal public good then the rich will want more than the poor, but will be rationed in their actual
consumption, which will be determined by the average level, possibly over some geographic
area. Then we can expect a strong income effect on the household's  desired level of public
safety.  However, we have interpreted DIPS as an indicator of the slope of the indirect utility
function with respect to public safety (equation 3), rather than the optimal level of public safety,
which would clearly be a much harder interpretation to defend.  Then the direction of the income
effect on DIPS will depend on the cross-partial derivative of the indirect utility function with
respect to income and public safety. If this is positive - so that greater public safety increases
the marginal utility of income - then the demand to improve public safety will have a positive
income slope. The curve shown in Figure 2 is consistent with this prediction. Higher total
spending is associated with a stronger desire to improve public safety.
There is also a strong indication that the desire to improve public safety is a concave
function of expenditure (Figure 2); the expenditure slope of DIPS falls as spending increases, and
is noticeably lower for the richest half of the population than the poorest half (comparing Figures
2 and 3). Concavity implies that any inequality-reducing redistribution of expenditures holding
the mean constant will increase the aggregate demand for public safety.'" However, one should
be cautious in drawing that conclusion since the concavity may well be an artifact of the fact that
the Desire to Improve Question  is bounded; one cannot answer more than "very important".
0  This  is an implication  of Jensen's  inequality,  and is a well-known  result from the literature  on measuring
inequality;  see Atkinson  (1970).
10This property of the scale means that diminishing returns must eventually set in.  Later we will
test for concavity in an unbounded continuous variable consistent with answers to the Desire to
Improve Question, assuming normal errors.
4.  An econometric  model of household  demand  for public safety
Following the argument of the last section, we interpret DIPS as an indicator of the
household's marginal utility of public safety, which is a continuous function of the current
objective level of public safety, prices, and total expenditure on private goods (equation 3).
We make three main assumptions in specifying our econometric model of the demand for
public safety:
Assumption 1: The underlying objective level of public safety is a pure local public good,
in that it is constant within suitably defined geographic areas.
Assumption 2: Differences in CVPS between otherwise identical households living in
different areas can be attributed to differences in their objective level of public safety, and
similarly for the DVPS.
Assumption 3: CVPS is a strictly increasing function of the objective level of public
safety at given household characteristics.
Assumptions 1 and 3 are unlikely to be contentious. But is Assumption 2 believable?
While other local public goods could clearly influence demand for public safety, this need not
violate Assumption 2 as long as those other local public goods matter via their effect on the
objective level of public safety in a neighborhood. It is not easy to think of a local public good
11that is likely to alter demand for public safety for a given household at a given actual level of
public safety.
So these assumptions still allows for geographic effects on the demand for higher public
safety, though these effects are assumed to operate via the latent objective level of public safety,
which is a local public good, and hence affected by local area characteristics. Assumption 2 thus
justifies the exclusion restriction that geographic variables do not alter DIPS at given household
characteristics, and for a given objective level of public safety.
Under these assumptions we will be able to identify the direction of the effect of
differences in the current objective level of public safety on household-level demand for
improving public safety. While we do not directly observe the current level of public safety, we
can use CVPS as an indicator.  Clearly if the Current Value Question correctly reveals the sub-
utility of public safety, and the functionfs  is the same monotonic increasing function for
everyone, then CVPS provides a valid proxy for the current level of public safety.  However, we
can weaken these assumptions considerably, by allowingfs  to be a function of consumptions of
private goods, as in equation (1).  Then (on optimizing out the demand for private goods), CVPS
will depend on prices and total spending as well as the current level of public safety.  This will
affect the interpretation of why prices and total spending matter to the demand for public
spending, but still allows us to use the self-rated assessment of current public safety as an
indicator of the current level of public safety.  We must however treat CVPS as endogenous to
DIPS.  Assumptions 1 and 2 justify using geographic dummy variables as instruments for CVPS
in a regression model of DIPS.
In addition to (log) expenditure per person and a geographic price index, we include
variables describing other household characteristics, notably household size and demographic
12composition,  stage of the life cycle  (age and age squared  of the household  head), and the gender
and education  of the household  head. These  variables  allow  for possible  heterogeneity  in
preferences  and measurement  error in other  variables. The main concem  in the latter respect is
probably that spending  per capita  may not be the right "income"  metric.  One way this might
happen is through  credit constraints;  then education  could matter via its effect  on expected  future
income. Another  way is via a miss-specification  of the appropriate  equivalence  scale. For
example,  if we should  not have  normnalized  total spending  by household  size but (say) its square
root (to allow for economies  of scale in consumption)  then household  size will appear  as a
significant  regressor,  independently  of consumption  per person.
To outline our estimation  method  in more formal  terms, let the structural  models  for
CVPS and DIPS be:
CVPS  +S+YXX+cv  (4)
DIPS  =(5)s  + 8x  +  eDI  (5)
where  the full set of household  variables  (including  prices and total expenditures)  is represented
by the vector  x and the s's are white  noise errors.
Since  public safety is a pure local public  good (Assumption  1),  the value of s will depend
on a vector  of geographic  variables,  z:
s=6z+v  (6)
where v is another  white-noise  error term. The vector  z comprises  two sets of variables:
(i) Indicators  of the area's attraction  to criminals;  for example,  living in a high rent area
will presumably  increase  vulnerability  to property  crime.
13(ii) Indicators of community-level demand for public safety. The averages of the
individual characteristics that influence household demand are obvious candidates. One also
wants to allow for social effects. The extent of "social capital" in an area can be expected to
increase public safety, by promoting forms of cooperative behavior.  How long'people have lived
in the area may well matter. Education could also influence the ability of local residents to
cooperate in crime prevention.
We can consistently estimate the coefficients on x in (4) and (5) by using (4) to solve out
s.  We cannot separate /1s  from y,.  We can however identify  ,Bx  / y  and thus use Assumption 3 to
infer the sign of 8  . To see how, use (4) to eliminate s from (5), giving the conditional demand
for public safety:
DIPS -sCVPS+  (fix -y)x  +  eDI-  (7)
Ys  Ys  rY
This cannot be estimated consistently by OLS, given that CVPS is correlated with the error term
(via equation 4).  However, under Assumptions 1 and 2, equation (6) justifies the use of the
geographic variables as instruments for CVPS in (7).  We will use a complete set of geographic
dummy variables as the instruments for CVPS.
The linearity in the above models is questionable, given that the dependent variable is
discrete.  This is of concern for interpreting the implications for inequality, given that the
qualitative questions are bounded, as discussed in section 3.  To address this concern we will
start with a specification in which we assume that DIPS in the above model is actually a latent
continuous variable, and the error terms are normal.  We can then estimate an ordered probit for
the qualitative answers to the Desire to Improve Question.  This will allow a more robust test for
concavity.
145.  Results
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. In addition to
expenditure, we include the education of the household head, the age, gender and race of the
head, household size and demographic composition. As an indicator of social capital we include
the proportion of the population not born in the municipality.  As an indicator of attractiveness to
criminals we include the average rent of the dwellings in the neighborhood (actual rent paid, or
imputed rent for owner occupiers)." External effects are also modeled by including mean
consumption and education of the head in the area as explanatory variables. We also allow for
interaction effects between the household and geographic variables; specifically, we shall include
the interactions between "own value" and "area value" for both consumption expenditure and
education.
T-he  estimated coefficients are in Table 3. The first two columns are ordered probits based
on equations (4) and (5), in which equation (6) has been used to solve out s, so that area-specific
variables are included. The ordered probit imposes an ordering on CVPS and DIPS ranging from
low (very bad, not important) to high (very good, very important). The remaining columns are
based on regression estimates where the qualitative answers are mapped to a scale from 1 to 5 (4
for DIPS). The iinear regression models assume that the qualitative answers are ordered and
equally spaced in terms of the underlying utility function. The latter assumption can be tested by
looking at the estimated threshold values of the ordered probit model. Figure 4 presents these
This will presumably also be influenced by the extent of public safety in a neighborhood, via effects on
housing demand.  This is not of concern for the econometrics, however; if anything, it adds to the case for
using average rent as an indicator of actual public safety.
15estimates  against  a linear (equally  spaced)  scale.  The fact that the lines for both models are
almost linear supports  the equal spacing  assumption." 2
As discussed  in section  3, we are interested  in testing  whether  the demand  for public
safety is concave  in expenditure  on private goods. The negative  coefficients  on'  the cross terms
with mean area  consumption  imparts  convexity,  but the effect  is well outside applicable
consumption  levels.  The functional  form using log per capita  consumption  is not sufficiently
flexible to allow  both convexity  and concavity  (at different  consumption  levels).  To relax this,
we tried adding  the reciprocal  of consumption  per capita  to the DIPS regressions.  This extra
parameter  is sufficient  to assure  that the functional  form does not impose  concavity.  The term in
the reciprocal  of consumption  was insignificant  by a t-test (coefficients  and standard  errors are
reported at the bottom of the table). So concavity  is confirmed,  even when we allow for an
unbounded  latent variable.
How much does inequality  contribute  to DIPS9 A simple  way to measure the
quantitative  importance  of inequality  to the demand for public safety is to simulate  the effect of
eliminating  all inequality  while  holding  mean consumption  and all other variables  in our model
constant. It is readily verified  that the increase  in the expected  value of DIPS (for  the linear
model) is then the regression  coefficient  on iog consumption  times the Theil indices  of
inequality,  given by the difference  between  the log of mean consumption  and the mean of log
consumption. From Table  2 we find that the Theil index is 0.457. From Table 3, the estimated
regression  coefficients  on log consumption  for linear  models  of DIPS range from 0.1  Ito  0.24.
So even at the upper bound  of this range  the increase  in the average  value of DIPS is only 0.11,
12  It is clear from the coefficients and their standard errors that none of them are significantly different from the
expected value if a straight line was fitted.
16on a scale from one to four.  While there is an effect of inequality in dampening,the demand for
public safety in Brazil, the magnitude of the effect is small.
We find significant effects of the geographic variables on both CVPS and DIPS. Holding
real per capita consumption constant, higher prices for private goods have a negative influence
on CVPS and positive on DIPS. The negative effect on CVPS implies that higher consumption of
private goods (with downward sloping demand curves) generates a higher utility from public
safety. The positive effect of DIPS implies that living in more costly areas increases the marginal
utility of public safety. More immigrants in the area reduces CVPS and increases DIPS. No
significant effects of the local rents are found in the CVPS. The positive significant effect of local
rents on DIPS indicates a higher willingness to pay for public safety when living in a high rent
area. Living in an urban (rather than rural) area does not have a significant effect on either CVPS
or DIPS, holding the other geographic variables constant.
To investigate external effects on the DIPS we have made Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5
shows the predicted DIPS as a function of per capita consumption for a poor and a rich area,
holding all other explanatory variables constant at the mean levels. The poor area is set at the 25th
percentile while the rich is set at the 75't percentile of the consumption distribution. DIPS is
higher in the poor area than in the rich area. As income rises, DIPS increases in both areas but
more so in the poor than in the rich. In rich areas, which are relatively safer, the income slope for
DIPS is lower.
Notice that the difference in the expected DIPS between poor and rich areas (as illustrated
in Figure 5) controls for (amongst other things) average dwelling rent in the area, which we
interpret as an indicator of the area's attractiveness to potential thieves.  The effect in Figure 5
17we can interpret as arising from positive external effects of local demand for pubjic safety on
individual demand.
Figure 5 also gives the corresponding results when we delete average dwelling rent from
the model. This can be given a reduced-form interpretation, treating average dwelling rent as a
function of mean consumption in the area.  The difference between the demand curves in poor
and rich areas has narrowed, but we still find that demand for public safety is higher in poor
areas, ceteris paribus.
Very different effects are found for education. As shown in Figure 6, there is  little effect
of own education for people living in an area in which the average education level is high. Even
poorly educated people living in these areas have a high desire to improve public safety. In areas
where average education is low, in contrast, the effect of own education on DIPS is strong.
Since both higher own education and higher education in the area of residence increase
demand for public safety, it is natural to ask which is more important.  From Table 3 (column 4)
we find that the marginal effect of higher own education on DIPS is 0.30 minus 0.31 times mean
education in the area. The marginal effect of higher education in the area is 0.05 minus 0.31
times own education. Thus own education has the higher marginal impact if and only if own
education exceeds education in the area of residence plus 0.061 years.  The latter term is small,
so our results suggest that own education has the higher (lower) impact when the household is
better (worse) educated than its neighbors.
However, it is clear that there are geographic effects on demand that we have not been
able to identify. This is indicated by the fact that including area dummies instead of geographic
variables in the regression models improves the fit considerably. The adjusted P3 for CVPS
increases from 0.022 to 0.301. For DIPS, the adjusted R 2 goes from 0.101 to 0.443 (Table 3).
18The two stage  least squares  estimates  are reported  in the last column of Table 3.
Assumption  2 justifies using the CVPS regression  with geographic  fixed effects  (5 th  column)  as
the first stage regression  (since,  under that assumption,  geographic  variables do not matter
independently  of the objective  level of public  safety and individual  characterisiics,  including
budget  constraints).  The coefficient  on CVPS is negative  and significant  in the final 2SLS
regression  for DIPS (last column).  Given Assumption  3, this implies  that  A. <0 (recalling
equation  9). Higher current  public  safety reduces  the desire  to improve public  safety, consistent
with diminishing  returns.
So there is evidence  of a corrective  mechanism,  operating  via demand for public safety.
However,  the size of the marginal  effect  of CVPS  on DIPS is small; a one standard  deviation
increase  in the CVPS is predicted  to result in a drop of 0.14 of a standard  deviation  in DIPS
(using  Tables 2 and 3).
6.  Conclusions
We have analyzed  the demand  for public  safety in Brazil using a household  survey
containing  information  on subjective-qualitative  assessments  of the perceived  current  level and
the desire  to improve  public safety. Compared  to private  goods, we find strong income  effects  on
the desire to improve public  safety. There is a much lower,  though still positive,  income effect
for the current level of public safety.  The desire  to improve  public safety is a concave  function  of
consumption  expenditure.  Thus  higher inequality  reduces  demand  for public safety,  though the
quantitative  effect  of inequality  on aggregate  demand  appears  to be small.
19Using geographic dummy variables as instruments we have been able to estimate the
effect of the current level of public safety on demand for improving public safety. The partial
effects indicate that, conditional on individual characteristics, the desire to improve public safety
is a decreasing function of the current level.  This is consistent with the self-correcting
mechanism in response to crime postulated by Philipson and Posner (1996).  We also estimate
the effects of household characteristics on the conditional demand for public safety. The
conditional demand (controlling for actual public safety) has a positive income effect and is
higher for better educated and larger households.
We find evidence of strong neighborhood effects, controlling for individual
characteristics.  Living in a well off area has an ambiguous effect on household demand for
public safety; on the one hand, high-rent neighborhoods offer more to potential thieves; on the
other hand, individuals living there can free-ride on their neighbor's  greater efforts to prevent
crime. We find evidence of both effects. However, the latter effect dominates; while being poor
lowers household demand for public safety, living in a poor areas increases it.  Having well
educated neighbors increases demand for public safety, and reduces the marginal effect of own
education of demand. However, it is clear that there are other neighborhood effects on demand
for public safety that we have not been able to explain with the data available.
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Figure  4: Estimated  cut-off points  for the ordered  probit  models
2539T
3.8  poor  area
Cd~  3.7  -~  - - - - poor area (no rent) 3.7
.3.6  ne  ncDarea(norent)
34t
3.3
0  100  200  300  400  500  600
consumption  expenditure  per  person  (Real/Month)
Figure  5: Predicted  desire to improve  public safety as function  of consumption
3.8 T
average
3.7.  education in
3.6  1  . . .11  yrs  education
ia  3.5  - _  _  _
.'34.~-/6 yrs education
.2  3.41
e  i.  no  schooling
3.3
3.1  llll
0  5  10  15
education  of head
Figure  6: Predicted  desire  to improve  public safety as function  of education
26Table 1: Subjective assessments of public safety
Desire  to improve  (%)
Very  Important  Little  Not  Total
important  importance important
Current
value
very good  2.07  0.43  0.16  0.08  2.74
Good  14.7  11.08  2.17  0.49  28.43
Regular  17.42  11.73  1.63  0.12  30.89
Bad  15.57  10.41  1.22  0.06  27.26
very bad  7.36  2.78  0.43  0.1  10.67
Total  57.11  36.42  5.61  0.85  100
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Mean  Standard
deviation
Current value of public safety (CVP1S)  2.853  1.035
Desire to improve public safety (DIPS)  3.498  0.643
Consumption per person per month /a  275  373
log consumption /a  5.160  0.912
Years of education of household head/b  6.494  4.471
Age head of household (/100)  0.463  0.154
Dummy head=female  0.229  0.420
Dummy head=white  0.485  0.500
Household size  3.929  2.010
log(household size)  1.230  0.555
Fraction boys 0-17  0.155  0.183
Fraction girls 0-17  0.150  0.181
Fraction females 18-60  0.299  0.213
Fraction old males 61+  0.052  0.159
Fraction old females 61+  0.069  0.189
Urban  0.767  0.423
log(mean monthly dwelling rent) /c  5.111  0.974
Percentage immigrants  0.418  0.192
/a Monthly,  deflated  to Sao  Poalo  prices, in Brazilian  Real.
/b Constructed  variables  based  on the educational  attainment
/c Includes  imputed  rent for home owners
27Table 3: Determinants  of current  value and desire to improve  public safety,
Estimation method  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Ordered probit  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS
Dependent  variable  CVPS  DIPS  CVPS  DIPS  CVPS  DIPS  DIPS
Area fixed effects?  No  No  no  no  yes  yes  no (used as
instruments)
CVPS  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.090'
(0.015)
log per capita consumption  -0.160  0.483'  -0.119  0.244*  0.071*  0.111'  0.115*
(0.119)  (0.134)  (0.123)  (0.075)  (0.029)  (0.017)  (0.015)
years of education of head  0.016  0.044'  0.016  0.030'  0.003  0.009'  0.021*
(0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)
age head (/100)  -0.814  -0.929  -0.756  -0.451  -0.586  -0.442  -0.502
(0.622)  (0.701)  (0.578)  (0.368)  (0.524)  (0.308)  (0.369)
head's age squared (/10000)  1.164  0.958  1.123  0.450  0.715  0.409  0.484
(0.649)  (0.729)  (0.598)  (0.368)  (0.538)  (0.326)  (0.388)
Dummy head=female  -0.073  -0.042  -0.074  -0.018  -0.022  -0.035  0.013
(0.048)  (0.055)  (0.046)  (0.028)  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.028)
Dummy head=white  0.049  0.031  0.050  0.017  0.046  0.023  0.001
(0.033)  (0.038)  (0.033)  (0.019)  (0.032)  (0.017)  (0.019)
log(household size)  0.028  0.144'  0.024  0.076*  0.021  0.091'  0.104*
(0.044)  (0.050)  (0.042)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.023)  (0.026)
Fraction boys 0-17  0.036  0.273'  0.040  0.132*  0.064  0.126*  0.074
(0.118)  (0.135)  (0.113)  (0.067)  (0.101)  (0.055)  (0.068)
Fraction girls 0-17  -0.064  0.313'  -0.043  0.139'  0.074  0.122'  0.079
(0.119)  (0.136)  (0.116)  (0.069)  (0.102)  (0.057)  (0.069)
Fraction females 18-60  0.234'  0.097  0.238-  0.039  0.119  0.090  0.068
(0.100)  (0.113)  (0.098)  (0.058)  (0.088)  (0.049)  (0.059)
Fraction old males 61-  -0.156  -0.078  -0.153  -0.040  -0.045  -0.023  -0.032
(0.131)  (0.144)  (0.126)  (0.079)  (0.112)  (0.068)  (0.080)
Fraction old females 61+  0.216  -0.093  0.215  -0.056  0.083  0.022  -0.025
(0.128)  (0.143)  (0.123)  (0.080)  (0.110)  (0.065)  (0.080)
(Continued next page)
28Ordered  probit  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS
Dependent variable  CVPS  DIPS  CVPS  DIPS  CVPS  DIPS  DIPS
Area fixed  effects?  no  No  no  No  yes  yes  no
log (mean  consumption  in area)  -0.133  -0.051  -0.084  -0.032
(0.133)  (0.149)  (0.135)  (0.089)
log(own  consumption)*log(mean  0.041  -0.048'  0.032  -0.024
consumption  in area)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.013)
Mean  years of education  in area  0.007  0.077'  0.009  0.049'
(0.015)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.009)
years own education  x mean  -0.110  -0.393  -0.122  -0.314
years of education  in area (/100)  (0.125)  (0.143)  (0.123)  (0.080)
Dummy  urban=1  0.048  0.062  0.057  0.050
(0.053)  (0.060)  (0.051)  (0.031)
Regional  price deflator  -0.691  0.684  -0.681  0.290
(0.238)  (0.278)  (0.227)  (0.122)
log(average  rent in area)  -0.027  0.158*  -0.041  0.082'
(0.045)  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.029)
Percentage  immigrants  in area  -0.340  0.228'  -0.336'  0.124
(0.083)  (0.096)  (0.080)  (0.047)
Constant  n.a.  n.a.  3.864*  1.891*  2.464*  2.795*  2.967*
(0.709)  (0.466)  (0.197)  (0.111)  (0.116)
Threshold  1  -2.485  0.589
(0.710)  (0.800)
Threshold  2  -1.539  1.541
(0.710)  (0.799)
Threshold  3  -0.727  2.991
(0.710)  (0.800)
Threshold  4  0.732  n.a.
(0.710)
(pseudo)  R squared  0.010  0.057  0.026  0.104  0.382  0.507  0.075
F(553,4354)  4.615  7.037
test for concavity: (coefficient  on  1.033  -1.488
1/consumption  per person)  (3.166)  (1.368)
Note: Robust  (White  correction)  standard  errors  in parentheses.
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